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THE PROBLEM OF THE UNPROVIDED CASE
JOHN DiCKINSON.t

Every lawyer is familiar with the problem of the "unprovided case"the case which does not fall squarely and obviously within the terms of a
statute or rule established by precedent.' These are the interesting cases, the
cases which interrupt the monotony of routine practice, and under our common-law system with its restriction of appeal in most instances to questions
of law, they are the cases which reach appellate courts, find their way into
the books, and become precedents for the future.
The problem of the unprovided case assumes greater or less importance
at different epochs, and at any given epoch in different branches of the law.
All lawyers know from experience how immediately after the enactment of
an important statute there are countless situations of possible doubt in the law
until the statute has been construed by the courts in decisions which can serve
as precedents. On the other hand where no new statute has been enacted, but
where human enterprise and ingenuity have suddenly become active in a
given field of business or social relations, creating new types of transactions,
relationships, and interest-conflicts, this spawning of novel situations raises
doubts in great numbers as to the proper legal rules applicable.
In our western civilization no period has ever been purely static and immune from change in one or another department of human activity, with the
result that no epoch of legal history has been completely free from the problem of the unprovided case. All we can say is that at some periods the problem has presented itself in one field rather than another and that in some ages
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it has been insistent in a larger number of fields simultaneously than at other
times. With the speeding up of the rate of change and progress which has
marked the increase in mechanical inventions and the development of economic organization during the last hundred and fifty years, the problem has
tended to become more omnipresent and insistent in a larger number of fields
of law than ever before.
I
The problem of the unprovided case is one of finding grounds for reaching a decision of a case where those grounds are not directly and clearly supplied by existing rules and precedents. How and where are such grounds to
be obtained? On what principle of selection are they to be chosen from various possible grounds which might lead to diametrically opposite decisions of
the case? These are the questions which confront both the judge who is
called on to render a decision and the lawyer who has to advise a client. Both
are faced with the same problem, but with this difference, that the lawyer if
he is to advise his client soundly must attempt to reach the same result which
will be reached by the courts if the case should be litigated, while the judge,
at least if he is a judge of a court of last resort, is under no similar necessity
for making his conclusion conform to the anticipated conclusion of another
mind. Since the lawyer must thus conform his technique so far as possible
to that of the courts in order that he may anticipate the result at which they
will arrive, it is highly desirable that the technique which the courts employ
for finding grounds of decision for unprovided cases should be settled with
reasonable certainty and understood with reasonable precision by the bar.
This necessity for understanding the technique of deciding unprovided
cases has become more and more obvious to the profession during the last
half century, and has consciously or unconsciously attracted an increasing
share of the attention of legal thinkers. It is the fundamental motive underlying the so-called "case-method" of law-teaching, which aims to put before
the student not merely the dry bones of established and ready-made legal
rules, but the living processes by which cases are decided for which the rules
are not already settled. Nevertheless the nature and meaning of the problem has not been fully appreciated until comparatively recent years, and most
of the earlier contributions made to its solution were made more or less unconsciously and without direct reference to the issues involved. Ideas have
accordingly survived which tend to confuse and obscure the considerations
on which a solution of the problem depends.
In the seventeenth and the early part of the eighteenth century, when
many of the lines of our present legal processes were laid down, it is fair to
say that the problem of the unprovided case was taken for granted and not
clearly envisaged as a problem at all. The bulk of litigation of the time lay
in the field of real-property law where the rules had already been elaborated

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNPRO1VIDED CASE

to great fullness and required little more than direct application to the cases.
On the other hand a strict formalism in the attitude of lawyers, and a tendency to reduce most questions to questions of procedure, led to a willingness
to deny relief in cases which did not fall squarely within the terms of a
precedent. Whenever an issue arose which seemed to the judges to call for
relief not directly warranted by precedent, the case was apt to be decided on
broad and vague grounds of "natural justice" and an unanalyzed sense of
right and wrong, and of what was fair and just from a lay point of view.
There is astonishingly little close legal reasoning in our modern sense; there
are very few instances of an elaborate chain of analysis and deduction anywhere in the old reports. Toward the middle of the eighteenth century the
tendency to decide unprovided cases on the basis of so-called natural justice
increased, and many of the most famous decisions of Lord Mansfield can be
reduced in the last analysis to no other grounds than the opinion of that
great Judge that fairness and convenience required the result arrived at. It
was this characteristic of Lord Mansfield's decisions which antagonized the
latent desire of the bar for more settled and definite grounds of decision, and
which justified the reaction under Lord Kenyon toward a more technical and
2
closely reasoned jurisprudence.
The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed a splendid outburst of
intellectual effort in the field of the common law which shaped the basic assumptions still current among the legal profession in common-law countries
as to the nature of law and the technique of its application. This effort is
associated with the names of such jurists as Kent and Story and Parsons in
this country and Chitty, Sugden, Williams and Blackburn in England. Carrying forward the thought of the jurists of continental Europe in the preceding century, 3 they conceived law as a system or "science" in the sense of
I See for example Lord Justice Scrutton's criticism of Lord Mansfield's liberal use of
the action for money had and received, Holt v. Markham [1923] I K. B. 504 at 513 and Lord
Sumner's criticism in Baylis v. Bishop of London [1913] 1 Ch. 127. Lord Sumner said:
"Whatever may have been the case 146 years ago, we are not now free in the 2oth century to
administer that vague jurisprudence which is attractively styled 'justice between man and
man'." For an interesting comparison of Lord Mansfield with Lord Holt see 6 Hos swoRTH,
HIsToRY OF ENGLIsH LAw (ist ed., vols. IV-VII, 1924) 521-522. Eighteenth century natural
law theorists like Mansfield and the contemporary French jurists regarded considerations of
natural justice as themselves forming a system whose precepts could be deduced from other
parts of the system by logic. For a popular expression of this assumption, see I BL. Comm.
(Christian's ed. 1825) 41. This view differs from the nineteenth century view in that it places
the logically complete system outside and not inside the body of authoritatively established
rules of positive law consisting of statutes and precedents. Positive law consists of those
parts of natural law which happen to have been already caught and fixed.
' "Since there is nothing more necessary in sciences than to possess the first principles of
them . . . that they may serve for a foundation to all the particulars which are to depend
upon them; it is of importance to know what are the principles of laws in order to know
. . . the rules which depend on them. . .
All the laws which govern society in the
condition in which it is at present are no other than consequences of these first principles, or
laws. . . . In order to judge therefore of the spirit and use of the laws which maintain
society in the condition in which it is at present, it is necessary to draw a plan of society on
the foundation of the two primary laws to the intent that we may discover the order of all the
other laws, and the connection which they have with these." i DomAT, THE CIvIL LA.v IN
ITs NATuRa. ORDER (Strahan's tr. 1737) xxxiv, xxxvi.
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a body of rules all rationally related to and connected with one another in
such a way that any given rule can be deduced by a process of logic from
other rules already known. 4 The bearing of this conception on the problem
of unprovided cases was direct, and its influence enormous. It formed the
attitude toward the problem which still prevails, and which has become even
more dominant through the influence of the case-method of teaching in the
law-schools.
The notion that legal rules are so connected rationally that one can be
deduced from others leads to the conclusion that in the last analysis there is
no such thing as an unprovided case. If the rules which arq already established grow out of one another inevitably by a mere process of reasoning, it
seems to follow that rules which have never yet been applied because their
application has not chanced to be called for are yet fully implicit in the body.
of existing rules,5 and that if a new case arises which calls for a hitherto
unapplied rule, this rule can at once be deduced from the body of existing
rules in the same way in which those rules themselves are supposed to have
been deduced. There was thus consciously affirmed the doctrine of the "logical completeness" of the law, with the corollary that when an unprovided
case arises the existing law already contains the proper legal ground of decision in spite of the fact that that ground of decision has never been applied
in any preceding case. The theory is thus that it is not necessary to go outside the boundaries of existing law to find the ground of decision of new
cases; that the law, being complete, is necessarily self-contained, and that the
ground of decision of new cases is to be sought not in something outside the
precedents, like natural justice or a common-sense opinion of right or wrong,
but within the body of technical law itself as expressed in the precedents.
This notion underlies the theory of the case-method of law-teaching as it was
conceived by the inventor of the method, Langdell of Harvard. Langdell
assumed that the entire body of existing precedents if treated inductively
would reveal themselves as a system of particular instances of the application
of certain general principles from which there could then be deduced by logic
the proper rule to apply to any particular case falling within the scope of a
principle. 6 The process thus indicated was sufficiently technical to satisfy
'These views resulted from the attempt to treat law as a kind of geometry, possessing
mathematical certainty, which was promoted by the great advance of the mathematical
sciences in the 17th century and the resulting tendency of other lines of intellectual activity
to borrow from mathematics. See DicxxxsoN, ADMINISTRAT=v JUSTICE AND THE SuPREMiACY op LAW (Cambridge, 1927) 115, note 15. Quite comparable was the borrowing by other
disciplines of the concept of biological evolution in the later Igth century.
"It is supposed that the law contains within itself the materials for the decision of every
case, however novel in its circumstances; and accordingly when the judges have a new case
before them, they do not profess to arrive at the law by reasoning, by theory, or by philosophical inquiry, but they profess to discover itby searching among the records of former decisions." Lord Westbury, Speech on Revision of the Law, in WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF
CASES (2d ed. 1894) 75.
'See Keener, The Inductive Method in Legal Education (1894) 28 Am. L. REv. 7o9,
713; M. Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 622, 627.
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the demands of lawyers who were discontented with a crude appeal to lay
considerations of natural justice and fair dealing, and on the other hand
promised sufficient flexibility to make the law adaptable to the new cases
which were constantly being presented by a progressive and changing civilization. The essential characteristic of the method, however, was its deliberate and conscious insistence that the law for new cases is to be found inside
the law itself and not by resort to considerations and ideas drawn from outside the field of technical law.
It is a striking fact that this conception of law as self-contained, and as
making it unnecessary to seek grounds of decision for new cases outside existing technical law, took possession of the jurists of Continental Europe
during the same period, although the legal environment in which they were
working was as different as possible from that of the American and English
legal systems during the nineteenth century. The Continental jurists in a
country like France were concerned with applying not a system of unwritten
rules based on precedents, but a detailed Code which had been adopted in
its entirety at a single moment. Nevertheless they took the view that this
Code constituted a complete and scientific system of law precisely as the
nineteenth century English and American jurists looked on the common law
as constituting such a system, and the resulting attitude toward the problem
of unprovided cases was the same. The great French commentators from
Duranton to Laurent definitely assumed that from the statutory rules enacted in the Code there could be deduced without looking beyond the four
corners of the Code the one and only correct rule which was legally applicable
7
as the ground of decision for an unprovided case.
This assumption was what first attracted conscious attention to the
problem of the unprovided case at the end of the nineteenth century. Once
again the legal thought of Continental European countries and of commonlaw countries marched in the same direction at the same time. The rapid
changes which were taking place throughout western civilization in prevalent conceptions as to some of the most fundamental human relations and
institutions: the position of woman; the institution of marriage and divorce;
the relation of parent to child; of employer to employee; of owner to property; the rapid evolution of new types of economic activity and organization; the growth of corporations; the development of banking, and the
emergence of new methods of production and transportation, alt created an
unprecedented mass of novel situations for courts and lawyers to deal with.
The attempt to deal with these situations strictly on the basis of rules deduced from pre-established and existing rules created dissatisfaction among
7
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jurists like Esmein and Raymond Saleilles,8 who never broke completely
with the old assumptions, and concentrated attention on the defectiveness of
the theory of the logical completeness and self-contained character of law.
In consequence, the problem of the unprovided case became a center of conscious interest, and most of the jurists who devoted their study to it in the
years about the turn of the century developed a new outlook and attitude
toward law and its technique which register one of the great germinal epochs
in the history of legal thought. Of these jurists the one who came most
directly to grips with the central problem, and who has devoted the most
single-minded and painstaking study to its solution, has been Franqois Gdny
of the University of Nancy. 9
What chiefly dissatisfied the newer thinkers was the idea that already
existing rules of established positive law contained within themselves, and
without resort to outside aids, the proper legal solution of all cases that
might arise.10 In France the technique of the great commentators on the
Code was challenged on the ground that it made the law too rigid
and did not sufficiently permit its adaptation to meet problems which not
only were never heard of by the authors of the Code, but would have
been inconceivable to them. In Germany the revolt expressed itself in an
extreme form in the movement for so-called free "judicial decision" which
recommended leaving the decision of cases substantially to the discretion of
the judge on the basis of the merits of each case. 1 In the United States,
where the older method was felt by many to have led to manifest injustices
in the field of the law of husband and wife, master and servant, and constitutional law, the new tendency emerged in the so-called "sociological jurisprudence" sponsored by Dean Pound. 1 2 The central idea of "sociological jurisprudence" was that the grounds of decision of unprovided cases should be
sought not purely in deductions from existing rules but also in the study of
social ends and purposes, of current views as to moral and economic values,
'A. Esmein, I REVuE TRIMESTRiELLE DE Daorr CIVIL (1902) 1316 quoted in I GLNY,
SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PRIVA POSlIF (1922) 29. R. Saleilles, preface to GENY,
M]THOD- D'INTERPRkrATION ET SOURCES EN DROrr ParVt PosirF, quoted in BONNECASE, Op.

cit. supra
note 7, at 48-50.
9

M-THODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVk POSIrnF (1899) (2d ed. 1919)
4 vOls.
ET TECHmQUE EN DRorr P~ivf PoSrrIF (914-24)
"See E. JUNG, VON DER LOGISCHEN GESCHLOSSENHErT DES REGHTS (Berlin, igoo);
ZITELMANN, op. cit. supra note I; L. BRT, DIE KUNST DER RECHTSANWENDUNG (Berlin,
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DIE GEmE INSCHADLICHxET DER KONSTRU TrvEN JURISPRUDENZ (19o9); E. FUCHS, R CT
UND WAHRHEIT IN UNSERER HEUTIGEN JUSTIZ (1908). The dangers o.f the movement are
pointed out in BEROLZHEIMEE, DIE GEFAHREN EINER GEFfHLSJURISPRUDENZ (Berlin, 1911)

parts of which are translated in SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD, supra note I, at 166 ff. See also
OERTMANN, GEsErzESZWANG UND RICHTEFRIHEIT (Erlangen, i909). For further bibliographical references on the movement see SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD, supra at 146, i66,
170, footnotes; I GkNY, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE 36.
' See especially his article The Courts and Legislation (1912) 7 Am. PoL ScI. REv. 361,
reprinted in SCIENCE OF LE-aAL METHOD, supra note I, at 202.
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and in a knowledge of the facts and methods of social and business life
which would indicate the appropriate legal devices for attaining the results
felt to be socially desirable.
II

Immensely valuable as have been the total results of the new movement,
one unfortunate consequence has been the misconception which it has generated as to the place of logic in the development of law. It has tended to
represent logic as an independent agency in legal development to be contrasted unfavorably with other agencies such as recourse to historical, philosophical and sociological materials. For this view the older jurists were
themselves chiefly responsible in their assumption that existing legal rules
could be extended to new cases with no other assistance than that supplied
by logical processes alone.
Philosophers have seen the necessity in recent years of insisting that
logic is not an instrument which works in a vacuum. The results of its processes depend always on the materials put before it to work upon. What we get
out of a syllogism depends on what is filled into its major and minor premises,
and the question of whether or not a minor will fit under a major turns in the
last analysis on the extra-logical process of constructing the premises. It is
this fact which makes it impossible to speak of logical deduction as a method
for developing law co6rdinate with the historical and sociological methods.'3
These latter relate to the source of the materials to be used as a basis for
legal reasoning-in other words, to the accumulation and choice of the data
on which legal logic is to do its work. The logical method must be part of
the application of any other method-it is concerned with the employment of
the data which the other methods put at its disposal. This was not sufficiently realized by all the newer jurists, nor by the older jurists whose work
they criticized. The defect of the latter was that the meaning which they
filled into their premises was often too meager and inadequate-in their
effort to exclude from those premises all considerations except such as
seemed to be drawn from existing rules of law alone, they narrowed unduly
the meaning and content of such rules. They did not fully grasp that the
meaning of a rule of law depends after all on the meaning and ideas embodied in the words which express the rule, and that the meaning of words
reaches out from law into life so that no rule of law can be used as the basis
of reasoning without some consideration of what lies beyond law. Lacking
this understanding, they were not always conscious of the processes which
"There is ground for criticism when logic is represented as a method in opposition to

others. In reality it is a tool that cannot be ignored by any of them. The thing that counts
is the nature of the premises." CARnozo, THE: GRowTH oF THE LA-W (1925) 62, referring
to Morris Cohen, Introduction to TourTouaox, PHILosoPHY IN THE DEvELOPMENT oF LAW
(1922) 29-30.
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gave content to the premises they employed, and the meaning of those premises was accordingly too often filled in for them unconsciously and accidentally. The progressive jurists grasped the truth that existing legal rules
themselves can be understood only in the light of ideas and information
drawn from outside law, and that the process of collecting and selecting
such ideas and information needs to be performed by lawyers with a full
and conscious understanding of what is being done; but they have too much
neglected the fact that this material can be properly utilized in the development of law only through the instrumentality of logical reasoning, and in
consequence they have tended to belittle improperly the place of logic in legal thinking and to conceive the employment of new materials drawn from
history and sociology as somehow a substitute for logic.
The relation between logic as an agency in the development of law and
the part played by the selection of the niaterials to which logical processes
are to be applied can be illustrated by two sets of opposing decisions in the
law of married women. The first get raises a problem in the interpretation
of the earlier type of married women's property acts. These acts provided,
first, that a married woman should have the right to own, acquire, and enjoy separate property as if sole; and, secondly, that she should have the right
to contract with reference to such separate property. The question arose
under such statutes whether a married woman having no separate property
and contracting to purchase property could be held on her contract. In different jurisdictions, and at different times in the same jurisdiction, this
question was answered in opposite ways. One result was reached by a line
of reasoning which started from the proposition that since a married woman
could contract only with reference to her separate property, she must already own such property at the time of the contract and that therefore a
contract for the acquisition of property was not binding if she owned no
other property when the contract was made. 14 Exactly the opposite result
was reached by a different chain of reasoning which started from the proposition that by the statute a married woman was given power to acquire property, that a contract of purchase was an appropriate means of exercising
this power, and that therefore the statute when limiting the married woman's
contractual capacity to contracts made with reference to her separate property included the case of property acquired by the contract itself. 15 As the
latter argument was put by Judge Cooley: "The contract is for the acquisition of separate property, and the title to it vests when the contract is made.
There is therefore no straining of terms in saying that the contract is in
'Ames v. Foster, 42 N. H. 381 (1861); Jones v. Crossthwaite, 17 Iowa 393 (864);
Walker v. Jessup, 43 Ark. 163 (1884) ; Palliser v. Gurney, i9 Q. B. D. 519 (887).
See Tillman v. Shackleton, i5 Mich. 447, 456 (1867) ; Building & Loan Ass'n v. Jones,
32 S. C. 308, 313 (1889) ; cf. Wilder v. Richie, 117 Mass. 382 (1875) ; Sidway v. Nichol, 62
Ark. 146, 34 S. W. 529 (i8g6).
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relation to her separate property. Nothing in the statute limits her capacity
so as to prevent her making the first acquisition any more than any subsequent ones on credit."'"
The second set of decisions chosen for illustration relate to the question
whether a husband who has abandoned his wife without means of subsistence is liable to one who supplies her with money for the purchase of necessaries. It is settled law that the husband is liable to one who supplies the
necessaries themselves. Starting from this established rule, one line of decisions reaches the conclusion that.in equity the husband is also liable to the
person supplying the wife with money to buy necessaries, while at least one
case reaches the opposite result. The decisions allowing recovery result from
reasoning that since the persons supplying the necessaries could themselves
have recovered against the husband, equity will treat one who supplies the
money paid to such persons as standing in their shoes and subrogated to their
right of action against the husband.1 7 The decision reaching the opposite result goes on the argument that since the wife paid for the necessaries when
bought, no right of action in the persons supplying them ever arose against
the husband, and that therefore there was nothing for the person furnishing
the money to be subrogated to; while such person is prevented from acquiring any right against the husband because of want of "privity".' 8
It seems clear that in neither of the foregoing instances does the contradiction between the decisions result from logical error. The difference
in result is due instead to the different meanings given to the premises of the
reasoning, and these differences in meaning are due to the inclusion or exclusion of considerations other than established rules of law. Take for
example the case of a contract of purchase made by a woman having no
separate property at the time. Which of the two opposing results will be
reached depends on the interpretation given to the statutory expression "contracts in reference to such separate property". To take this expression to
mean "property already owned at the time of the contract" results from disregarding the additional provision of the statute which permits a married
woman to acquire property. Whether or not this provision is to be so disregarded, or is to be employed as justifying a broad interpretation of the
provision conferring contractual capacity, cannot be decided on the basis of
mere logical deductions from the rule. A decision of the question one way
or the other turns upon whether or not the court thinks that the statute
should be given a broad or narrow construction; and this in turn depends
upon whether or not the court regards the contractual capacity of a married
2 Tillman v. Shackleton, supra note I.
'Walker v. Simpson, 7 W. & S. 83 (Pa. 1844) ; Kenyon v. Farris, 47 Conn. 51o (i88o).
This was the long-established doctrine in equity, Harris v. Lee, x P. Wins. 482 (Ch. 1718);
Jenner v. Morris, 3 De G. F. & J. 45 (Ch. App. 1861).
I Skinner v. Tirrell, i59 Mass. 474, 32 N. E. 669 (1894).
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woman as something desirable and to be extended, or as undesirable and
therefore to be limited. On this point the decision in either direction turns
ultimately on the court's view as to issues which can be intelligently faced
only on the basis of information and considerations lying outside the four
corners of established rules of law. The defect of the older jurists is that
they did not fully realize the important and ultimately decisive character of
considerations of this kind. They took for granted the views of social policy on which decisions of unprovided cases in the last analysis depend, instead of regarding such issues as worthy of their closest and most deliberate
scrutiny. Consequently they unconsciously read into the meaning of established law views of policy which they happened personally to regard as normal, and concluded that the results flowing from such views were logically
implicit in the law itself. The great contribution of the modern school of
jurists has been to expose this fallacy and to reveal the important part which
non-legal considerations always play in the process of deducing new rules
from established ones.
The second set of cases considered, those namely which involve the
liability of a husband for money furnished to an abandoned wife for necessaries, disclose how even when the transition from an established rule to a
new one is made nominally by means of an intermediate technical concept like
"subrogation" or "privity", the ultimate result once more depends on the
non-legal considerations which determine views of policy. In neither instance is the transition from the premise to the conclusion determined conclusively by the intermediate legal concept. For example, while it is clear
that there is no "privity" between the husband and the person supplying the
wife with money, this does not conclusively require that there should be no
right of action against the husband, since it is equally true that there is no
privity between the husband and the person supplying the wife with necessaries, and yet the husband is liable to the latter. On the other hand, if the
concept of subrogation is employed, it is correct enough to point out that
subrogation in the usual sense cannot arise since the goods are paid for when
bought and no right of action accrues to the seller; but it remains equally
possible to argue that the reason upon which subrogation depends is present
and that the concept of subrogation should be extended by analogy. In
short, the determination to apply or exclude the concept of subrogation or
privity depends in great measure if not wholly on whether or not it is regarded as desirable to extend or limit the liability of the husband ; and only
after this decision has been made does the legal concept intervene decisively
to give technical form to the result. 9
" See CAOZO, op. Cit. supra note 13, at 99, discussing Hynes v. New York Central Rail231 N. Y. 229, 31 N. E. 898 (I92i).

road Co.,
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No one has examined more closely or in greater detail how the results
of legal reasoning depend on the content which is initially filled into legal
concepts, or how legal "constructions" like the concepts of privity and subrogation are employed to give shape and direction to considerations of policy,
than Professor G~ny. 20 At the same time both GCny and Pound have
pointed out the danger of applying such constructions divorced from the
ultimate considerations of policy upon which they are founded. Any such
construction, applied as if it had an inherent content of its own and in forgetfulness that it is a mere instrument to give effect to policy, leads to the
purely formal and often absurd results which Pound has characterized as
"mechanical jurisprudence". 21 Perhaps the most extreme illustration of
such mechanical jurisprudence has been the application of the concept of
"privity" in the law of interpleader, where it has had the effect of preventing
in many instances precisely the type of relief which it is the function of
interpleader to give.22 Similarly the mechanical application of the concept
of "freedom of c6ntract" in constitutional law, divorced from regard for
the particular problems to which the concept was adapted, has often led to
denial of the very protection which it was the object of the concept to bring
about.23

It is this extension of a concept to everything which can be brought

formally within the possible meaning of the words, and without regard to
the substantive purpose of the concept, which is sometimes exclusively
thought of as the logical method of the development of law. In fact it is no
more logical than the sounder method which begins by interpreting the
premises of the reasoning in the light of the problems which it is the aim of
the law to solve.2 4 To analyze and criticize premises before beginning to
reason from them does not deprive the subsequent reasoning of its title to
be called logical.
III
The realization of the part played by considerations not purely legal in
supplying grounds of decision for unprovided cases indicates as the next
problem for progressive legal thought a more detailed analysis of these nonlegal elements, and of the way in which they enter into combination with preexisting legal materials to form new precedents and rules of decision. To
i GANY, SciEC Er TEcHNiQUE at 164; 3 id. at 175-257.
SPound, Mechanical Jur4sprudence (x9o8) 8 CoL L. REv. 605.
See Chafee, Interstate Interpleader (924) 33 YALE L. J. 685.
= See Pound, Liberty of Contract (igo9) 18 YALE L. J. 454.
"We may take as our premise some pre-established conception and work it up by an
effort of pure reason to its ultimate development, the limit of its logic. We may supplement
the conception by reference to extrinsic sources, and apply the tool of our logic to the premise
as thus modified or corrected. The difference between the function of logic in the one case
and in the other is in reality a difference of emphasis. The tool is treated on the one hand as
a sufficient instrument of growth, and on the other as an instrument to cooperate with others."
CARnozo, supra note 13, at 62.
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this fundamental problem G~ny has devoted substantial attention and has
made pioneer contributions of the greatest value. 25 However, taking the
field of current legal thought as a whole, interest has for the moment tended
to become diverted from this constructive field of investigation, and the
nature of the problem itself has tended for the moment to be obscured,
through the failure of many of the most advanced legal thinkers to shake
themselves loose from a group of ideas inherited from earlier stages of legal
thinking, and which have so far prevented a direct approach to the central
issues involved.
We have already seen how the legal thought of the nineteenth century
expressly assumed that all the materials which form the grounds of decision
of an unprovided case and go into the creation of new law were themselves
derived from the law itself-that, in other words, nothing but law went into
the formation of new law. Oddly enough the very thinkers who have insisted on enlarging the materials which are to form ingredients of new rules
have too often been unable to shake off the conception that all these materials
must themselves still be regarded, as law-they remain enmeshed in the old
assumption that nothing but law must enter into the making of law. This
has been particularly true of such thinkers as Professor Duguit and his followers in France, and, indeed, it is true of the sociological school in general.
The result has been the emergence in very recent years of a new theory of
so-called "natural law", which forms one of the most significant present
phenomena in jurisprudence.
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The new school of natural law results from an attempt to treat as law
the entire body of those considerations of social value and policy which it is
quite properly insisted must enter into the selection of grounds of decision
for new cases. To treat these considerations as law implies, of course, that
they are marked by two characteristics which have hitherto always been regarded as involved in the concept of law: first, a certain clarity and definiteness which makes possible something approaching codification of their precepts; and secondly, an authoritative character which entitles them to exercise mental compulsion on the mind of the judge to the exclusion of inconsistent and competing precepts. Now it is a very difficult thing to predicate
these characteristics of the more or less vague and intuitive considerations
of social theory and policy which properly form ingredients in the process
of minting new legal rules. Accordingly a great deal of the legal theory of
the last few years has been devoted to grappling with this difficulty and two
wholly inconsistent lines of approach have been followed alternatively and
sometimes even simultaneously by the newer theorists.
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On the one hand there has been a strenuous effort to show that considerations of social policy can be formulated into clean-cut and unambiguous
precepts carrying compulsive intellectual conviction. This attempt usually
takes the form of assuming~that there is a "science" of human society and
social relations which is scientific in the same full and complete sense as
chemistry and physics, and which dictates with truly scientific precision the
objectives which law exists to promote and the exact legal rules necessary to
promote them.2 7 The fallacy of this idea, which for the moment is widely
prevalent among American legal thinkers, has nowhere been more successfully combated than by C6ny,28 who has pointed out that the determination
of legal rules must always depend on ultimate judgments of value, of better
or worse, more preferable or less preferable, with which science has no
concern, since science in the proper sense of the word is limited to establishing accurate descriptive connections between cause and effect, and to indicating that if one.result is desired one course of action must be pursued,
while another course must be pursued to reach a different result. There is
no contribution to recent legal literature which should be more worth the
while of current American legal scholarship to ponder than the pages of
GUny's great work which he devotes to a discussion of this topic.
The hopelessness of the attempt to find in "social science" a new body of
authoritative natural law has not, however, dampened the effort of
many of the newer jurists to discover ready-made natural law in other directions. This effort has resulted in a definite recurrence by some writers to
the frankly mediaeval conception of natural law as a body of authoritative
precepts deducible from a scheme of values supposed to be inherent in human
nature and which can only be transgressed at the cost of outraging the highest and noblest aspirations of humanity. Such a doctrine has all the appeal
of clothing the honest convictions of each individual judge with the mantle
of eternal verity. As Mr. Justice Holmes has said in expressing his dissent
from it, it appeals to the innate human desire of every doughty knight that
his lady shall be not merely fair, but the fairest lady in all the world. 29 The
difficulty is that the values which different human beings regard as ultimate
and absolute are not always the same values, and that, therefore, as Dean
Pound has pointed out, all theories of natural law result in making law ultimately personal and subjective."0 Nowhere is this better illustrated than by
the fact that both extreme socialists and extreme advocates of the rights of
property vouch natural rights to warranty in support of their mutually inconsistent claims; the ones insisting that there is a natural right in every
See Dickinson, The Law Behind Law (1929) 29 CoL.
es i GfNY, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE 179-ISI.
"Holmes, Natural Law (igi8) 32 HARV. L. REV. 40.
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human being to a livelihood, and the others that every man has a natural
right to do what he wills with his own. Such antagonisms are insoluble on the
basis of an appeal to supposed natural law, and the recurrence at the present
time of natural law theory with its doctrine of absolute rights promises ill
for the patient and conciliatory solution of- some of the deepest problems of
modern civilization.
The recurrence of natural law theory under the influence of the new
jurisprudence represents one result of the survival of the idea that all the
materials which enter into the construction of a new legal rule for an unprovided case must themselves be law. Natural law theory results from attempting to combine this idea with the notion of precision, certainty, and
authoritativeness which inhere in the idea of law. The questionable character of the result, and the apparent necessity to which it leads of reviving discredited natural law theories have caused other recent thinkers to seek a solution in a different direction. These thinkers, however, also remain enmeshed
in the idea that the considerations of social policy which enter into the decision of unprovidecd cases must somehow be "law"; but they are awake to
the undesirability of attempting to give them the precise and authoritative
character hitherto associated with law. In consequence, the result at which
they arrive, and which represents the very latest development of legal
thought, is that the idea of law itself must be purged of these characteristics
which have always been associated with it-that law must henceforward be
understood as something different from a body of more or less definite rules
distinguished from other rules by their title to exert an authoritative influence on judicial decisions. This newest school of jurists may be described
as the school of legal sceptics, for whom law has melted into a fluid mass of
factors of any and every kind which happen to influence the decision of any
particular judge in a specific case. Law in this sense does not consist of
rules, nor is it vested with any authority. 31 It is said to be simply whatever
judges do. The law of every case is peculiar to itself and different from the
law of any other case. Law simply means official action.3 2 Any attempt to
formulate and apply legal rules is said to amount to no more than a futile
attempt at self-deception. There is a body of law only insofar as there can
be said to be a behavioristic psychology of judges.
This final outcome of the new jurisprudence represents a scepticism
which like most other scepticisms is in fact only a kind of inverted absolutism. Whereas under the old absolutism the legal rule was everything,
under the new absolutism it is nothing. And yet, on any realistic or pragmatic view of the judicial process, it seems clear that there are factors in that
See the elaboration o~f this idea in FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (N. Y. 1930).
See Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step (i93o) 30 CoL. L. R v. 431,
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process which for want of some other name can be called legal rules, and
which do in fact exert an influence on the process. A ,truly objective approach to an understanding of the process cannot afford to shut its eyes to
this fact and behave as if the fact did not exist, but must recognize that
under a developed legal system the process of deciding cases differs to at
least a certain extent from the exercise of arbitrary discretion by an oriental
cadi. It is this difference which forms a worthwhile subject of study if we
are to understand the nature and operation of law as an agency of social
control. We cannot get far towards such an understanding by treating law
simply as discretionary official action. If we do so, we merely make believe
that the problem does not exist, instead of attempting to solve it. No advance toward better understanding of the making of legal decisions is therefore promised along the path of the new scepticism. Rather we need to go
forward to further and more detailed analysis of the interaction between
legal rules on the one hand and discretion on the other which is presented in
the decision of every unprovided case. 3 3
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